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WHAT FRANK ALLEN TEACHES 
Robert A. Burt* 
Frank Allen was dean of the University of Michigan Law School 
when a junior appointment was offered to me. As dean he spoke for 
the school; but Frank symbolized more than that for me, something to 
which I aspired as a legal scholar. I could not clearly identify this at 
the time, but I knew nonetheless in 1970 when I joined the Michigan 
faculty that Frank's presence and his example there were compelling 
attractions for me. Two years later I was fortunate enough to enter 
into an intensive collaboration with Frank that showed me more 
clearly what I had glimpsed before. 
The occasion for this collaboration was a request from Judge Hor- 
ace Gilmore, then on the Wayne County Circuit Court, that Frank 
serve as counsel to a man who had purportedly volunteered for experi- 
mental psychosurgery after eighteen years' confinement in the state 
maximum security mental institution. A taxpayer's suit brought 
before Judge Gilmore had challenged the propriety of this apparent 
consent and of the experiment generally; Gilmore preliminarily de- 
cided that the man, known then only as John Doe, needed indepen- 
dent counsel and turned to Frank. I was lucky that Frank was both 
too busy to accept on his own and too intrigued (and responsible) to 
decline. Frank asked if I would accept the court's appointment with 
him and I grabbed the chance. 
Our joint service as attorneys for Louis Smith (for his real name 
was ultimately made public, as I will recount) was an engrossing expe- 
rience for me. Of all the dimensions of that experience, none was 
more enriching for me than a seemingly incidental aspect: that for 
more than a month, while the trial proceeded to examine the scientific 
and social merits of psychosurgery and the adequacy of consent from 
any involuntarily committed person,1 Frank and I commuted between 
Ann Arbor and Detroit. Our two hours together each day were a con- 
tinuous revelatory education for me. 
The central lesson I derived from that course can be described by 
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University. - Ed. 
1. The court ultimately decided that adequately voluntary consent could not be obtained for 
experimental psychosurgery from any involuntarily committed person. Kaimowitz v. Depart- 
ment of Mental Health, 2 Prison Law Rptr. 433 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. 1973), reprinted 
in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902 (1974). 
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relating one part of our representation of Louis Smith. Frank and I 
divided responsibility for this representation. Immediately after Smith 
agreed that we should serve as his attorneys, I researched the constitu- 
tional legitimacy of the basis for his confinement. In 1954, when he 
was seventeen, Smith had been indicted for murdering a nurse in a 
state mental institution in Kalamazoo where he had been civilly com- 
mitted. He was never brought to trial, however, but was instead 
judged to be a "criminal sexual psychopath"; under the state law then 
in force, anyone so designated would be indeterminately confined until 
"fully recovered" but could never be tried for the originally charged 
offense.2 The legislature repealed this statute in 1968, noting doubts 
about its constitutionality under intervening judicial decisions but 
resolving nonetheless to retain custody over all those previously adju- 
dicated under the statute.3 By 1972, when the psychosurgery experi- 
ment was presented to Smith by Wayne State University researchers, 
he was one of only twenty-four remaining "criminal sexual psycho- 
paths" in state confinement. My research found that recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions clearly established the unconstitution- 
ality of the original statute and accordingly of Smith's continued con- 
finement. A three-judge panel of the Wayne County Circuit Court 
agreed with my argument and Smith was freed.4 
On the very day of his release, however, the Kalamazoo County 
Prosecutor announced his intention to prosecute Smith for the 1954 
murder. If the Criminal Sexual Psychopath statute were constitution- 
ally invalid, he reasoned, then its bar to prosecution was also invalid 
and Smith could be tried notwithstanding the lapse of nineteen years 
and his confinement during this time. A bench warrant was issued for 
Smith's arrest; Frank took responsibility for arguing against the war- 
rant and renewed prosecution - and we extended our circuit-riding to 
include a trip between Ann Arbor and Kalamazoo. The presiding cir- 
cuit judge there was, as it happened, the same judge who had civilly 
committed Smith eighteen years earlier to the state mental institution 
where the murder had occurred. He was not persuaded by Frank's 
argument that the renewed prosecution offended both norms of funda- 
mental fairness, which would require that the state honor its original 
promise to Smith, and more specific guarantees of the right to a speedy 
trial. 
2. MICH. COMP. LAWS ?? 780.507-08 (1948) (repealed 1968). 
3. MICH. COMP. LAWS ? 330.35b (1970); MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, IN- 
TERIM REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO THE 1967 SPECIAL SESSION, 5 MICH. HOUSE J. 
115, 119-20 (1967). 
4. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. HC73-19434AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne 
County, Mich. Mar. 23, 1973) (unreported). 
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We then proceeded to the state intermediate court of appeals. 
Frank wrote the brief, which was marked by the same clarity, the 
same taut reasoning, the same eloquence as all of his more widely cir- 
culated work. Here are two passages from it: 
The position of the prosecutor is supported neither by good morals, 
good logic, nor good sense. In this procedure the State of Michigan is 
seeking to take advantage of the invalidity of its own statute in order to 
evade its specific undertaking to bar criminal prosecution of appellant, 
and to proceed on the wholly fictional basis that nothing has happened 
by reason of the [Criminal Sexual Psychopath] law in this case. Nor can 
this unattractive posture be justified by appeals to the public interest. 
The facts charged in the information allegedly occurred almost a genera- 
tion ago. The prosecution has made no effort to show that appellant is 
today a danger to the community, nor has any public official invoked the 
procedures of civil commitment against appellant whereby a determina- 
tion of present danger could be made. In any event, the civil commit- 
ment procedures continue to be available should evidences of danger by 
reason of mental disorder appear.5 
Here the prosecut[or] proposes to reinstate a prosecution after one of 
the longest periods of delay in the American judicial literature on the 
right to speedy trial. The attorney for the state seeks to excuse this delay 
because of a constitutional deficiency in a statute of the state he is repre- 
senting. ... Appellant has sustained over eighteen years of incarceration 
under some of the most rigorous institutional conditions to be found in 
this state. He is now asked to defend himself against criminal charges 
for acts allegedly committed by him nearly a generation ago when he 
was an adolescent confined in a state mental hospital and suffering from 
serious mental disorder. If these facts do not make out a case for enforc- 
ing the right to speedy trial, one may wonder what its purpose and utility 
is.6 
The Kalamazoo Prosecutor's office was stung by this brief, perhaps 
because of the severity of its criticism, perhaps also because this criti- 
cism came from a former dean of the University of Michigan Law 
School. Whatever the reasons, their underlying resentment was ap- 
parent from an unusual letter that the chief of the appellate division in 
the prosecutor's office, Stephen M. Wheeler, sent to Frank. Wheeler 
stated that he was "greatly dismayed at the language and implica- 
tions" of Frank's brief. "When we assumed the positions of Prosecutor 
and Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, we left neither our morals, logic, 
or good sense behind." This was the core of his complaint: 
As I review the briefs of lawyers fresh out of law school, and your 
brief, I have come to the conclusion that one aspect of the law not taught 
in law school classes is the proper decorum and respect between attor- 
5. Brief on Appeal for Defendant-Appellant at 12, People v. Smith, 57 Mich. App. 556, 226 
N.W.2d 673 (1975) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Brief]. 
6. Id. at 24. 
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neys. One of the basic tenants of professionalizm is that while the advo- 
cate does his absolute best to represent the cause of his client, he does 
not do so by attacking the integrity or morality of the attorney represent- 
ing the opposite party.7 
Wheeler thus rested his grievance against Frank on the premise 
that an attorney's personal morality cannot properly be judged by the 
position he advances on his client's behalf. I would not say that Frank 
wholly rejected this premise. It plays an important and proper part in 
establishing that attorneys may, and often must, zealously represent 
clients whose actions or views are morally abhorrent to them: thus 
Frank could represent a man who might have brutally murdered a 
nurse. But I would say, based on my extensive course with Frank, 
that he was uncomfortable with the premise and that his discomfort 
arose not so much from abstract ratiocination as from the depths of 
his character. The premise that an attorney is not personally responsi- 
ble for the position he advances for his client can imply a kind of 
moral relativism that is antithetical to Frank's nature - as if the best 
or even the only route to truth were unconstrained advocacy of any 
imaginable position in the courtroom or the "marketplace of ideas" in 
the same way that social welfare is supposedly achieved "invisibly" in 
an Adam Smithian market by everyone acting on the premise of unre- 
strained selfish aggrandizement. 
Frank was simply incapable - characterologically incapable - of 
this kind of blinkered, self-referent conduct. The idea that he could be 
exonerated from personal responsibility for advocacy on a client's be- 
half could therefore not sit comfortably with Frank. He saw too 
clearly the comfortable self-deceptions made possible by this kind of 
moral detachment. This danger was indeed epitomized by the position 
of the Kalamazoo prosecutors in Louis Smith's case. Whatever the 
merits of the distinction between attorney and client in the private 
practice of law, that distinction has much more attenuated relevance 
in public representation. The Kalamazoo prosecutors could maintain 
that their personal integrity and morality were irrelevant to their deci- 
sion to renew Smith's prosecution only by imagining that there was "a 
client" somewhere - a mythical embodiment of John Q. Public 
who directed this action and thereby exempted the prosecutors as 
merely obedient instruments of the Public Will. 
The prosecutors may indeed have deluded themselves into this be- 
lief; if so, their lack of integrity, their inability to understand and ac- 
7. Letter from Stephen M. Wheeler, Chief of Appellate Division, Office of the Prosecuting 
Attorney, Kalamazoo County, Michigan, to Francis A. Allen (Jan. 29, 1974) (copy on file at 
Michigan Law Review). 
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cept personal responsibility for their own actions, was subject even to 
harsher criticism than Frank aimed at them in his brief. I must say, 
however, that it is difficult to imagine a more stringent criticism than 
Frank directed midway in his brief, in explaining why the prosecutor's 
delay could not be excused by his erroneous reliance on the constitu- 
tional validity of the original committing statute: "It is the decision to 
revive the prosecution, not the long suspension of the proceedings, 
that shocks the conscience in this case .... The prosecutor is not a 
private litigant and may not be permitted to take advantage of the 
statute's deficiency .... "8 
The striking characteristic of Frank's brief in this case was pre- 
cisely what stung the Kalamazoo prosecutors: his willingness to make 
explicit moral judgments.9 What I learned from Frank in the course 
of our collaboration - or, more precisely, what I learned about him, 
because this was a lesson that he did not so much teach as exemplify 
- was his basis for this willingness. Frank's moral analysis arose 
from his character. Not intelligence or ratiocinating rigor - though 
Frank has these qualities in abundance. Not mastery of formal social 
science disciplines like psychiatry or economics - though Frank has 
clear command of the proper, and properly limited, uses of such disci- 
plines for legal scholarship. Law is fundamentally about public moral- 
ity. The capacity to reach judgment on such questions cannot depend 
on intelligence or formal analytic training alone. More is required. To 
say that Frank exemplifies this, and that his warrant for moral judg- 
ment resides in his character, is to acknowledge my own inability to 
define this essential capacity or to explain how it can be taught or 
learned except in the personal examples afforded by great and gifted 
teachers. 
8. Brief, supra note 5, at 19. 
9. The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately, though belatedly, concurred in Frank's judg- 
ments. After the court of appeals rejected his position, People v. Smith, 57 Mich. App. 556, 226 
N.W.2d 673 (1975), the supreme court initially equivocated; by a four-to-three vote, the court 
ruled that the trial should proceed and that the objections raised in Frank's brief could be consid- 
ered on an appeal from any conviction. 396 Mich. 955 (1976). Frank and I then relinquished 
our representational responsibilities to Richard Ryan Lamb, a Kalamazoo attorney. In 1976, 
Smith was convicted of having committed first-degree murder (in 1954) and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Three years later, the Michigan Supreme Court unanimously reversed Smith's 
conviction. The court observed: 
[T]he prosecutor relies upon the legal fiction that since the act was a nullity from its 
inception, the state's assurance to Smith that he would never be tried or sentenced is like- 
wise a nullity. Thus the solemn promise of the sovereign is broken in the name of constitu- 
tional construction. 
We think that comports neither with traditional notions of fundamental fairness in the 
classic constitutional sense, nor the more elemental and compelling principles of fundamen- 
tal human justice rooted in the natural law. 
People v. Smith, 405 Mich. 418, 435, 275 N.W.2d 466, 471-72 (1979). 
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In one small way, however, Frank's work on this brief gave me a 
heartening lesson. Before this enterprise, I had only seen Frank's 
work in published or near-published form. While writing this brief, 
Frank showed me his earliest drafts direct from his typewriter. I was 
astounded that there were more than a few infelicities of expression, 
even some grammatical errors that I was able to detect in these drafts. 
When I confronted Frank with several egregiously split infinitives, he 
was surprised at my surprise. I had imagined because Frank's expres- 
sive eloquence flowed so beautifully on the published page that it came 
easily and quickly to him. I was mistaken. Frank's clarity and grace 
was an achievement for him; he worked hard at it. The intensity of 
this effort, the rigor of his self-criticism, were themselves a revelation 
to me. It gave me some hope that not only Frank's style but his con- 
tent were more than a natural gift. If this were true, then others had 
some hope, by emulating his intense self-scrutinizing efforts, of reach- 
ing toward if not ultimately attaining his accomplishments. 
As Frank Allen leaves the University of Michigan Law School to 
continue his teaching elsewhere, I would borrow an observation that 
Oliver Wendell Holmes made regarding Louis Brandeis: "Whenever 
he left my house I was likely to say to my wife, 'There goes a really 
good man.' "10 
10. Holmes, Introduction to MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS at ix (F. Frankfurter ed. 1932). 
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